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The Role of Historians in the History Prob lem
At fi rst glance, historians may not look like the best candidates for facilitat-
ing a resolution of the history prob lem. Th is is  because historians have 
traditionally used the nation as a primary unit of analy sis, helping to natu-
ralize it as a primordial entity. Th ey have also created professional associa-
tions and delimited their membership along national borders, consistent 
with the nationalist logic of self- determination; for example, when Japa nese 
historians write about the history of Japan, they often talk among them-
selves without consulting with foreign historians who study Japan. Th is na-
tionally bounded content focus and membership reinforces the logic of na-
tionalism that divides the world into discrete nations. Th us, even though 
historians are not necessarily supporters of nationalism, they have partici-
pated in nation- building as authoritative narrators of national history.1
But, at the same time, historians have regularly criticized nationalists 
for their tendency to simplify the past in order to create national myths and 
identity.2 Historians are acutely aware that historical evidence is often in-
complete to the extent that facts and interpretations of historical events are 
inevitably and inherently subject to controversy and  future revisions. While 
nationalists often resort to emotionally charged commemoration to trans-
form  these open- ended historical controversies into immutable historical 
truths as foundations of national identity, historians contest such national-
ist commemoration by exposing factual errors and unwarranted interpreta-
tions in light of available research.
In fact, over the last few de cades, historians have become more critical 
of nationalism in the methodological sense, breaking away from the nation-
ally bounded content focus and professional membership. Take, for example, 
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the recent growth of global and transnational historiography.3 Historians 
working in this new genre focus on economic, po liti cal, social, and cul-
tural interactions that traverse national borders, challenging the idea of 
nation as a discrete primordial entity. Historian Eric Hobsbawm even sug-
gested that any historiography should entail a global and transnational 
perspective: “Historians, however microcosmic, must be for universalism, 
not out of loyalty to an ideal to which many of us remain attached but 
 because it is the necessary condition for understanding the history of human-
ity, including that of any special section of humanity. For all  human collec-
tivities necessarily are and have been part of a larger and more complex 
world.” 4 Moreover, the norm has emerged that historians as well as history 
teachers should collaborate across national borders in writing history of past 
international confl icts, as evinced by the growing number of joint historical 
research and education proj ects in East Asia and other parts of the world.5 
 Th ese joint proj ects represent the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism 
in historiography, which shifts a unit of analy sis from the nation to trans-
national interaction while incorporating foreign perspectives into histori-
cal narratives.
In this chapter, then, I critically examine the potential for historians 
in problematizing nationalism and promoting cosmopolitanism in the poli-
tics of war commemoration. In recent years, the presence of historians in 
the history prob lem has increased, given that generations who did not expe-
rience the Asia- Pacifi c War became the majority in Japan, South  Korea, and 
China— they learn about the war mostly from history lessons in school. In 
theory, then, historians who participate in joint historical research and edu-
cation proj ects have the capacity to help  these generations disentangle 
nationalist commemorations from the problematic historical judgment of 
the Tokyo Trial and move  toward more cosmopolitan commemoration. 
But, at the same time, their  actual infl uence on the relevant po liti cal actors 
in the fi eld has yet to be systematically examined. To what extent did histo-
rians succeed in shifting governmental and public commemorations from 
nationalism to cosmopolitanism? What barriers did they encounter in try-
ing to infl uence the dynamic and trajectory of the history prob lem?
Historians as Epistemically Oriented Rooted Cosmopolitans
To answer  these questions, it is fi rst necessary to understand the unique 
potentials of historians to act as “epistemically oriented rooted cosmopoli-
tans.” 6 Typically, rooted cosmopolitans are  those based in a single country but 
Role of Historians in the History Prob lem     157
endowed with openness to foreign  others.7 Th ey include immigrants whose 
biographies and social ties crisscross multiple nation- states, and activists who 
mobilize advocacy networks to address  human rights violations in vari ous 
parts of the world.8  Th ese rooted cosmopolitans show that openness to for-
eign  others is not merely an individual attribute but also a collective property 
sustained by transnational networks. As sociologist Craig Calhoun put it, 
cosmopolitanism is not “simply a  free- fl oating cultural taste, personal atti-
tude, or ethical choice” but is instead always embedded in specifi c networks 
of actors.9 According to this defi nition, historians, too, qualify as rooted cos-
mopolitans  because they develop transnational social networks by organ izing 
conferences and other professional activities to exchange methods, standards 
of excellence, and training programs, which are open to all nationalities.10
More importantly, historians are epistemically oriented rooted cosmo-
politans. Historians participate in the politics of war commemoration in 
the capacity of what sociologist John Meyer called “ Others,”  those who are 
defi ned as disinterested  bearers of “truths” and authorized to act as con sul-
tants for other po liti cal actors pursuing self- interests.11 In this res pect, 
historians form “epistemic communities” with regard to the history prob-
lem, that is, knowledge- based networks of “professionals with recognized ex-
pertise and competence in a par tic u lar domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy- relevant knowledge within that domain or issue- area.”12 Put an-
other way, historians are regarded as experts in providing reliable data and 
authoritative interpretations for relevant po liti cal actors in the fi eld of the 
history prob lem to justify their commemorative positions.
Th eir epistemic orientations distinguish historians from other types of 
rooted cosmopolitans in the history prob lem. Perhaps the most vis i ble type 
of rooted cosmopolitan is advocacy- oriented: members of Japa nese NGOs 
supporting South Korean A- bomb victims, former comfort  women, and 
other victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th ey extended solidarities across 
national borders, shared information and resources at the transnational level, 
and coordinated their actions to press the Japa nese government to adopt the 
cosmopolitan logic of commemoration.  Th ese advocacy- oriented rooted cos-
mopolitans, however, unwittingly intensifi ed the history prob lem  because 
they sacrifi ced historical accuracy for po liti cal expediency. Many NGOs 
in Japan and South  Korea, for example, categorically defi ned the comfort 
stations as rape centers and the military comfort- women system as sexual 
slavery by following the UN special rapporteurs. As anthropologist  C. 
Sarah Soh critically observed, such a categorical defi nition is “a po liti cal act 
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in support of the redress movement” and a “partisan prejudice” that elimi-
nates complexities of the system that operated diff er ent types of comfort 
stations and depended on Korean cooperation.13 Th e advocacy- oriented 
rooted cosmopolitans in Japan thus ended up perpetuating nationalist 
commemoration in South  Korea while galvanizing Japa nese nationalists 
to reject the claims by former comfort  women as fabrications.
In contrast, historians acting as epistemically oriented rooted cosmo-
politans have the potential to generate a diff er ent eff ect on the history prob-
lem. As historian Kosuge Nobuko pointed out, “Th e method of history, to 
interrogate historical materials (shiryō hihan), is best suited for correcting 
misunderstandings and distortions of the past. . . .  By interrogating histori-
cal materials and conducting empirical research, historians cannot but 
become  humble and accept scholarly asceticism [against indulging in ma-
nipulation of data and distortion of descriptions].”14 Historians are there-
fore capable of critically refl ecting on nationalist commemorations and pre-
venting historical inaccuracies and problematic interpretations from fueling 
the history prob lem. Indeed, joint historical research and education proj ects 
by historians in Japan, South  Korea, and China have shown their potential to 
generate mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations and promote the 
cosmopolitan logic of historical research.
Nevertheless, not all joint proj ects are equally eff ective in critiquing na-
tionalist commemorations. Th e pro cesses and outcomes of the governmen-
tal and nongovernmental joint proj ects show that the latter tend to be more 
successful in promoting the logic of cosmopolitanism.15 Th e nongovernmen-
tal joint proj ects, most notably the History to Open the  Future proj ect, 
allowed historians from Japan, South  Korea, and China to criticize each 
other’s nationalist biases. Th ey not only incorporated dialogues with for-
eign historians more eff ectively into the pro cess of historical research but 
also shifted content focus from the nation to the interaction of nations.
Th e governmental joint proj ects, by contrast, appeared to have diffi  -
culty facilitating mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations. In 
fact, the Japan- South  Korea Joint Proj ect was severely constrained by Japan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, which had long resisted revisiting the 1965 
Basic Treaty between Japan and South  Korea. Th e ministry feared that any 
reinterpretation of historical events mentioned in the treaty, such as Japan’s 
1910 annexation of  Korea, would pave the way for new compensation claims. 
One offi  cial in the ministry was reported to have said, “ Th ere is no room 
for a joint historical research proj ect to reinterpret the 1965 Basic Treaty. 
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Since reinterpretation of the 1965 Basic Treaty could lead to reigniting the 
prob lem of compensation, the possibility of scholarly agreement between 
Japa nese and South Korean sides is extremely small.”16 Similar constraints 
 were also found in the Japan- China Joint Proj ect, where Chinese historians 
 were restricted by their government in publishing the results of the joint 
proj ect.
I argue that the diff erences between the nongovernmental and govern-
mental proj ects derive from the diff er ent frames of identifi cation that they 
support. In general, two diff er ent frames of identifi cation are available for 
participants in a joint proj ect. Th e fi rst is a nationally bounded frame, such 
as “Japa nese,” “South Korean,” and “Chinese.” Th e second is a nationally 
unbounded frame, that is, “historian.”17 Th e nongovernmental proj ects fore-
grounded the nationally unbounded frame of identifi cation— the historian 
who is concerned about the escalation of the history prob lem— and this 
framing allowed the participants to suspend their national identifi cations 
to a signifi cant extent. Th e governmental proj ects, however, foregrounded 
the nationally bounded frame and positioned participants as representatives 
of their countries. For example, the Japa nese participants in the Japan- South 
 Korea and Japan- China Joint Proj ects  were selected by the Japa nese govern-
ment without consultation with professional associations of historians, and 
 these joint proj ects  were all managed by foreign ministries of respective 
governments.18 Th is kind of structural constraint made it diffi  cult for the 
participants to be open to foreign perspectives and dialogically transform 
their original positions.
Th e diff er ent pro cesses and outcomes of the nongovernmental and 
governmental proj ects also appear to depend on the dispositions of 
 participants—on the degree to which they  were already open  toward foreign 
 others. For example, the Japa nese participants in the History to Open the 
 Future proj ect included many left- leaning historians, such as Kasahara 
Tokushi, who had actively engaged in the social movement against conser-
vative politicians and NGOs. Th e History to Open the  Future proj ect was, 
in some re spects, an outgrowth of the existing transnational network of 
advocacy- oriented NGOs that had pressed the Japa nese government re-
garding apology and compensation for foreign victims of Japan’s past 
wrongdoings. Th e dispositions of participants can also partially explain 
the strug gle of the Japan- South  Korea Joint Proj ect, to which the Japa-
nese government appointed Furuta Hiroshi, a history professor at Tsukuba 
University known for his belief in the Japa nese  people’s superiority over 
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Koreans.19 In turn, the Korean side included Lee Man Yeol, a chair of the 
National History Committee, who insisted that “any research on  Korea 
must presuppose love for  Korea. . . .  Only with very strong love for  Korea, 
Japa nese historians can begin to understand Korean history correctly.”20 
 Th ese two historians with strong nationalist dispositions sat on the same sub-
committee and contributed to spreading distrust among other participants. 
Th e dispositions of participants therefore constitute another mechanism that 
can  either facilitate or forestall mutual criticism of nationalist commemora-
tions  because they situationally infl uence interactional dynamics among his-
torians. In short, due to the more open dispositions of participants, nongov-
ernmental proj ects tended to be more successful than their governmental 
counter parts in incorporating foreign perspectives according to the logic 
of cosmopolitanism.
Nevertheless, nongovernmental proj ects have limitations, given their 
overlap with advocacy- oriented activities. Take, for example, the History to 
Open the  Future proj ect. Overall, the Japa nese participants in this trilat-
eral proj ect refused to shy away from criticizing nationalist biases in South 
Korean and Chinese versions of history, and the South Korean and Chinese 
participants  were willing to include descriptions of Japan’s victimhood and 
question offi  cial versions of history promoted by their own governments. Th e 
Japa nese participants nonetheless sacrifi ced scholarly rigor for advocacy when 
they agreed to the fi rst sentence in A History to Open the  Future’s chapter 3, 
section 2.1, on the Second Sino- Japanese War: “On July 7, 1937, the Japa-
nese military started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in the vicinity of 
Beijing.” Th is sentence came  under heavy criticism from the community of 
Japa nese historians who, based on available evidence, had concluded that 
the Japa nese military had not plotted the incident.21 Some Japa nese histori-
ans also thought that A History to Open the  Future as a  whole was academi-
cally disappointing, and  others saw it with suspicion  because many of the 
Japa nese participants  were left- leaning and previously involved in advocacy 
activities for foreign victims of Japan’s past wrongdoings.22
In fact, one of the Japa nese participants, Saitō Kazuharu, was very much 
aware of the danger of “facile border- crossing (an’ ina ekkyō), a failure to criti-
cally examine the nature of dialogue and solidarity, [which] may lead the 
joint history textbook to disseminate wrong understandings.”23 Put another 
way, the danger was that if the Japa nese side simply expressed “facile” soli-
darity with the South Korean and Chinese sides and allowed problematic 
historical facts and interpretations, “the ultimate mission for the joint his-
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tory textbook proj ect . . .  to overcome narrow- minded nationalism” on all 
sides would be compromised.24 In turn, the potential of governmental joint 
proj ects to facilitate mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations can-
not be dismissed too hastily, for it was the Japan- China Joint Proj ect that 
ended up resolving the confl ict regarding the description of the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident: in its fi nal report, both Japa nese and Chinese historians 
agreed that the  battle between the Japa nese and Chinese militaries at the 
Marco Polo Bridge was started accidentally. Th is prompted Saitō to acknowl-
edge that “on this point [regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident], the 
governmental joint proj ect overcame the obstacle that the nongovernmen-
tal joint proj ect could not.”25
Mutual Criticism of Nationalist Commemorations
Observing  these joint proj ects in East Asia, Falk Pingel, a member of the 
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany, of-
fered the following refl ection: “In East Asia, only Japa nese textbooks are 
accused, while South Korean and Chinese textbooks are exempted from criti-
cal discussion. Reform is one- sidedly demanded on the Japa nese side, and it 
seems impossible to establish open relationships for mutual criticism and 
critical self- refl ections on one’s own history.”26 Pingel’s observation serves 
as an impor tant reminder that facile solidarity on Japan’s part could defeat 
the very purpose of any joint proj ect—to problematize all relevant nation-
alist commemorations— but it also underestimates how much historians in 
Japan, South  Korea, and China already engaged in mutual criticism of na-
tionalist biases. For example, Kasahara Tokushi, one of the Japa nese par-
ticipants in the History to Open the  Future proj ect, has been vocal about 
factual errors and nationalist commemorations in history textbooks used in 
China. While Kasahara acknowledged that Japa nese citizens failed to com-
memorate the Nanjing Massacre adequately, he also urged the Chinese side 
to “reconstruct ‘their aff ective and somatic memory’ from the higher per-
spective of  human history,” to pursue more scholarly rigor and move away 
from po liti cally and ideologically motivated historical interpretations.27
Chinese historians also began to establish a critical distance between 
themselves and the Chinese government’s offi  cial commemoration of the 
Asia- Pacifi c War. For example,  after the fi rst edition of A History to Open 
the  Future was published in 2005, the Chinese participants received many 
criticisms from inside China for not specifying three hundred thousand as 
the number of Nanjing Massacre victims. Nevertheless, they maintained that 
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the estimated number of dead varied according to diff er ent sources.28 As 
Cheng Zhaoqi and Zhang Lianhong, both of whom had participated in the 
trilateral proj ect, explained, historical research on the massacre has become 
less emotional in recent years, and Chinese historians have increasingly 
 recognized that more evidence is needed to estimate the number of dead 
accurately.29
 Th ese changes in attitude among Chinese historians  were confi rmed 
by Bu Ping, the director of the Center for Modern History within the Chi-
nese Acad emy of Social Sciences, who had participated in both the History 
to Open the  Future proj ect and other bilateral historical research proj ects. 
At an international symposium in Tokyo in April 2008, Bu observed, “Pre-
viously, Chinese historians conducted China- centered research and their 
knowledge of historical materials and research available outside China was 
inadequate. But this situation is changing. . . .  Although many Chinese be-
lieve shared historical understanding and reconciliation are impossible, we 
must make an eff ort [to achieve them].”30 Moreover,  after the 2010 fi nal 
report of the Japan- China Joint Proj ect was criticized for not stating “more 
than 300,000” as the defi nitive number of victims of the Nanjing Massa-
cre, Bu defended the report as the result of “the attitude to base [interpre-
tation] strictly on historical materials,” emphasized the importance of “pool-
ing archival materials and information” between the Chinese and Japa nese 
sides, and reiterated his belief that a “historical view can, and should, tran-
scend national borders.”31
Similarly, at the eighth Forum on Historical Views and Peace in East 
Asia, held in Tokyo in November 2009, Cao Yi, a researcher at the Museum 
of the Chinese  People’s War of Re sis tance against Japa nese Aggression, ob-
served that the Chinese commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War began to 
go beyond “anger and other feelings associated with being the victim,” given 
the recent eff orts to systematically collect data on Japan’s war time atroci-
ties.32 He then went on to suggest, “China should transcend the facile com-
memoration of the war motivated by anger  toward the aggressor and by the 
interests of the Chinese  people. It  will be more rational, though painful, to 
adopt geo graph i cally wider and temporarily longer perspectives in reexam-
ining the history, the real ity of Sino- Japanese relations, and the war and its 
commemoration. But this is exactly what we should aim for.”33  Th ese state-
ments from Cao, as well as Bu, Cheng, and Zhang, show that Chinese his-
torians have recently gained greater freedom to conduct research, despite 
the Chinese government’s patriotic education and censorship.
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In South  Korea, too, NGOs that participated in the History to Open 
the  Future proj ect or ga nized a forum in November 2005 to critically refl ect 
on the textbook that they had just produced. At the forum, vari ous partici-
pants pointed out that the textbook might have overemphasized Japan’s im-
perialist aggression, leading South Korean students to believe that Japan is 
an evil country, and that it could have also included more descriptions of 
Japa nese  people’s suff ering during the war as well as positive aspects of Japa-
nese history.34
In fact, a small but growing number of South Korean historians be-
gan to counterpose their critical refl ections to nationalist commemora-
tions in their country. In April 2002, the South Korean monthly journal 
Con temporary Criticism published three essays critically examining South 
Korean nationalism with regard to Japa nese history textbooks. Ji Su 
Geol criticized ethnic- nationalist biases in research on modern and con-
temporary Korean history, while Yun Hae Dong advocated that the na-
tional history textbook should be replaced with a new system allowing 
the production of multiple history textbooks. Th e journal editor Lim Jie 
Hyeon, a history professor at Hanyang University, was perhaps most crit-
ical: “Th e South Korean government’s national history textbook and 
JSHTR’s history textbook clash with each other  because they emphasize 
ethnic identities of South  Korea and Japan, respectively. On the episte-
mological dimension, they are rooted in the same soil— namely, ethnic 
nationalism.”35
As a member of the Conference of Japa nese and South Korean Histo-
rians (Nikkan Rekishika Kaigi), Lim was also troubled by the tendency to 
draw the line between victims and perpetrators along national borders. For 
him, the task of historians was to articulate “an approach that challenges 
dichotomous thinking, ‘Our ethnic group (minzoku) is the victim, and the 
other ethnic group is the perpetrator.’ ”36 Lim therefore insisted, “Th e asym-
metry in historical experience of imperialism and colonialism should not 
be used simply to criticize the nationalist historiography of Japan while help-
ing to legitimate the nationalist historiography of South  Korea. . . .  Decon-
struction of nationalist historiography cannot be confi ned within a single 
country but needs to be carried out si mul ta neously within East Asia as a 
 whole.”37 Another conference member, Ahn Byung Jik, a professor of his-
tory at Seoul National University, was also concerned that “the South Ko-
rean memory of Japan’s colonial rule is too rigid and self- contained. A 
prerequisite for reconciliation [between South  Korea and Japan] is to open 
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up the memory. . . .  For the purpose of reconciliation, it is not helpful to 
force one par tic u lar historical view.”38
Some South Korean historians even tried to critically refl ect on the is-
sue of comfort  women, perhaps the most explosive ele ment in the South 
Korean nationalist commemoration. One of them was Lee Yong Hoon, a 
professor of economic history at Seoul National University. He was a long-
time critic of the South Korean government’s history textbooks, which had 
contained many overblown sentences, such as “Imperial Japan oppressed and 
exploited our  people in a thoroughly atrocious fashion that has no compa-
rable examples in world history.”39 During a tele vi sion debate in September 
2004, Lee stated that no historical evidence had been found to support the 
widely held belief that the Japa nese military drafted Korean  women as 
“volunteer corps” to serve in comfort stations. He also argued that South 
Koreans should criticize not only Japan but also Koreans who helped the 
Japa nese military to recruit comfort  women, and Korean soldiers who 
used comfort stations.40  After the tele vi sion debate, the Korean Council for 
the  Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan condemned Lee 
for “making statements that only the most extreme right- wing person in 
Japan is capable of making” and demanded his public apology to former 
comfort  women and his voluntary resignation from the university. A sim-
ilar controversy erupted in December 2006, when Ahn Byung Jik also 
stated on tele vi sion that no historical evidence existed for the forcible re-
cruitment of Korean  women, and that Koreans played an impor tant role in 
recruiting comfort  women. He also revealed that he had left the Korean 
Council’s publication proj ect collecting the testimonies of former comfort 
 women  because he had felt that other proj ect members had been “more 
interested in fi ghting against Japan than in learning about the historical 
facts.” 41 Just like Lee, Ahn was subjected to heavy criticism from NGOs 
and citizens in South  Korea.
Although  these episodes demonstrated that the issue of comfort  women 
was still highly charged with nationalist sentiments in South  Korea, they 
also showed that it had become pos si ble to raise critical questions about the 
South Korean nationalist commemoration that depicted Japan as solely and 
entirely guilty for making the Korean  people suff er while accepting Korean 
victims’ testimonies as objective historical truths. In fact, the sixth volume 
of the Korean Council’s publication proj ect in 2004 dropped the title “Forc-
ibly Dragged Away Korean Military Comfort  Women.” Th e publication 
team deci ded to forgo the prevailing one- dimensional repre sen ta tion of 
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Korean comfort  women as forcibly drafted, in  favor of historical descrip-
tions that highlighted the complexity of the comfort- women system, its 
multiple methods of recruitment, and diff er ent types of comfort stations.42
Limited Inﬂ uence of Historians on Governments and Citizens
Th us, historians in Japan, South  Korea, and China have begun to engage in 
mutual criticism of nationalist commemorations. But how much historians 
can actually infl uence the governments and citizens in the three countries 
is another  matter. In this res pect, Bu Ping made an astute observation when 
he defended the Chinese side’s decision not to publish some of the papers 
and memos that the Japan- China Joint Proj ect had produced. Bu argued, 
“Th e history prob lem between China and Japan has three dimensions: po-
liti cal judgment, popu lar sentiment, and scholarly research. . . .  Th ese three 
dimensions are partially overlapped, though never perfectly. If a prob lem 
happens on one dimension, that would aff ect the other two dimensions. Th at 
is, if we want to overcome one dimension of the history prob lem, we have 
to take into consideration the other two.” 43 Put another way, even when 
historians— epistemically oriented rooted cosmopolitans— mobilize mutual 
criticism of nationalist commemorations, their criticism does not directly 
translate into changes in governmental and public commemorations,  because 
the latter two have their own dynamics. Th us, while historians in East Asia 
have produced a variety of joint research reports and common teaching ma-
terials, they have had only a limited impact on commemorations of the 
Asia- Pacifi c War in their respective countries.
I argue that this limited impact of the “historians’ debate” on the his-
tory prob lem stems from at least four institutional  factors. Th e fi rst  factor is 
the absence of institutional mechanisms that authorize historians’ critical 
refl ections to infl uence governmental commemorations. As Hatano Sumio, 
a historian of international relations who participated in the Japan- China 
Joint Proj ect, observed, “Th e fi rst objective of the proj ect, from the Japa nese 
government’s perspective, was to delegate the history prob lem to experts 
and ‘depoliticize’ it, so that it  will not interfere with Japan’s relations with 
China regarding such impor tant issues as trade, investment, natu ral re-
sources, and food security.” 44 Similarly, another participant, Kawashima 
Shin, a historian of modern and con temporary China, thought that joint 
proj ects by historians would have only a “very limited contribution to 
resolving the history prob lem  because their objective is mainly to pre-
vent politicization of the prob lem.” 45 Since governmental joint proj ects 
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are “depoliticized”— ceremonially treated as “venting mechanisms” for 
the history prob lem— they are unlikely to transform the existing offi  cial 
commemorations.
At the same time, the role of historians can be politicized in spite of 
the rhe toric of depoliticization. When Prime Minister Abe Shinzō tried to 
defend his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013, he insisted that 
it was not politicians but historians who should decide on the interpretation 
of Japan’s acts in the Asia- Pacifi c War: “Politicians must be  humble (kenkyo) 
about the issue of historical view. Governments must not determine a par-
tic u lar historical view as a correct one. Th is issue is up to historians.” 46 
Similarly, when revisiting the 1993 Kōno Statement that apologized for the 
military comfort- women system, Abe’s cabinet secretary, Suga Yoshihide, 
stated, “Our cabinet members agree that this issue [of comfort  women] 
should not be turned into a po liti cal and diplomatic prob lem . . .  and I hope 
that more scholarly research  will accumulate.” 47 Abe, Suga, and other con-
servative politicians, however,  were most likely to welcome only the kind of 
historical research that would discount Japan’s past wrongdoings. Th us, 
when the Cabinet Offi  ce established a fi ve- member commission to examine 
how the Kōno Statement had been created, Hata Ikuhiko, known for his con-
servative orientation, was appointed as the only historian.48 Hata’s appoint-
ment was in eff ect po liti cal, to support the position of Abe’s government, in 
the guise of “disinterested expert.” 49  Here, historians are not  really “depo-
liticized” but are part and parcel of the politics of war commemoration, ex-
ploited by politicians in power who seek to legitimate their commemorative 
position as “rational.” 
Th e second  factor is the existence of mass media as a mechanism that 
mediates the infl uence of historians’ debate on public commemorations. 
As historian Tessa Morris- Suzuki pointed out, “ Today, more than ever, we 
learn about the past from a multiplicity of media,” such as newspapers, tele-
vi sion programs, and movies.50 Indeed, the majority of citizens in Japan, 
South  Korea, and China are likely to learn most of the “facts” about the Asia- 
Pacifi c War from media rather than from historians and their scholarly 
output. But media companies constantly put spin on historians’ debate, given 
the po liti cal orientations of their readers and viewers. For example, when 
Murayama’s government was preparing the Asian  Women’s Fund in August 
1994, Asahi shinbun reported that the government planned to provide for-
mer comfort  women with one- time “sympathy money” (mimaikin) collected 
from Japa nese citizens, as well as published reactions from supporters of 
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former comfort  women criticizing the government for trying to evade its 
responsibility. According to Wada Haruki, one of the promoters of the fund, 
this news report downplayed the extent of intended “atonement” (rather 
than “sympathy”) within Murayama’s government, undermined the on-
going eff orts by some cabinet members to push for government compensa-
tion, and created distrust between the government and former comfort 
 women and their supporters.51 In South  Korea, too, mass media rarely pre-
sented information and interpretations that would contradict the ste reo type of 
unapologetic Japan.52 Similarly, Chinese mass media lashed out against JSH-
TR’s history textbook in 2001 but failed to report that only 0.039  percent of 
ju nior high schools  adopted the textbook.53 Th e escalation of East Asia’s his-
tory prob lem thus owed no small part to the mass media in the three countries 
that circulated sensational but misleading and even distorted information 
about Japan’s past wrongdoings and the Japa nese government’s actions.54
Th e third  factor is the weak institutional boundary of history as an 
academic profession. As sociologists Andrew Abbott and Th omas Gieryn 
illustrated, any “experts,” ranging from nuclear physicists to historians, con-
stantly engage in “boundary work” to distinguish themselves from “non- 
experts” and defend their “jurisdictions,” that is, their cognitive authority 
over certain kinds of activities.55 Such boundary work may include the es-
tablishment of professional associations, codifi cation of standard training 
programs, and legitimation of certain methods of collecting and analyzing 
data. History, however, is one of the fi elds in the humanities and social sci-
ences where the distinction between experts and non- experts is highly am-
biguous; for example, many local historical socie ties are or ga nized by ama-
teur historians, and  there is a long tradition of memoirs that  people narrate 
as historians of their own lives. Ultimately, as historian James Banner put 
it, “all  humans [are] acting as historians when chronicling and understand-
ing their own biographies, evaluating the meaning of the pasts they think 
relevant to their lives.”56 Since narrative is constitutive of repre sen ta tion of 
the past, the distinction between professional and amateur historians, both 
of whom use narrative, is more continuous than discrete.57 Th is makes his-
tory a most demo cratic discipline in the humanities and social sciences, but 
it also prevents professional historians from eff ectively intervening in the 
history prob lem by correcting factual inaccuracies and unwarranted in-
terpretations contained in offi  cial and public commemorations.
Th e weak authority of historians in Japan manifested most clearly in 
the way that the nationalist commemorations of comfort  women and the 
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Nanjing Massacre escalated in the 1990s. Th e Korean Council for the 
 Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, for example, claimed 
that the Japa nese government forcibly drafted Korean “female volunteer 
corps” into the military comfort  women system, with two hundred thou-
sand Korean  women forced into such work. But even the most sympathetic 
Japa nese historians, including Yoshimi Yoshiaki, as well as some South Ko-
rean historians, disagreed with the Korean Council’s claim.  Th ese histori-
ans pointed out that female corps and comfort  women had been recruited 
separately, recruiters had included Koreans, and the estimated number of 
Korean comfort  women was excessive.58  Th ese Japa nese historians also sug-
gested that testimonies should be carefully evaluated, as some former com-
fort  women had changed details of their testimonies over time. But the 
Korean Council refused to change its claims and even denounced seven 
former comfort  women who received atonement money, medical and wel-
fare relief, and a letter of the Japa nese prime minister’s apology from the Asian 
 Women’s Fund. Th e president of the Korean Council, Yun Jeong Ok, even 
argued, “By receiving the money that does not accompany the admission of 
guilt, the victims [the seven former comfort  women] admitted that they had 
volunteered to become prostitutes.”59
In the case of the Nanjing Massacre, too, Iris Chang’s Th e Rape of Nan-
king galvanized the American public, especially Chinese Americans. But Japa-
nese and American historians who specialized in modern and con temporary 
Chinese history criticized Chang’s book for its numerous inaccuracies and 
careless  handling of historical evidence. David Kennedy, a professor of his-
tory at Stanford University, doubted the validity of Chang’s claim that the 
massacre had been a systematic genocidal program comparable to the 
 Holocaust, while Joshua Fogel, a professor of history at the University of 
California– Santa Barbara, criticized Chang’s book for failing to carefully 
consider the credibility of the interviews and documents that she presented 
as “historical evidence,” as well as for misrepresenting the massacre as com-
pletely forgotten by Japa nese citizens.60 Kasahara Tokushi also requested 
Chang, face- to- face, to be more careful about interpreting available archi-
val materials.61
Despite vari ous prob lems in Chang’s book, the left- leaning publishing 
com pany Kashiwa Shobō planned to translate it into Japa nese  because the 
com pany believed that details of the Nanjing Massacre should be more 
widely known in Japan. When Kashiwa Shobō asked Chang to correct vari-
ous errors and inaccuracies in her book, however, she agreed to make only 
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about a dozen small revisions. Moreover, Chang refused Kashiwa Shobō’s 
proposal to pair the Japa nese edition of her book with an anthology of com-
mentaries critically evaluating the evidence and arguments presented in the 
book.62 In the end, Kashiwa Shobō gave up the Japa nese translation of Th e 
Rape of Nanking  because the com pany feared that the book’s serious fl aws 
would only give Japa nese nationalists more ammunition to discredit the 
Nanjing Massacre as a fabrication.63 Instead, Kashiwa Shobō published Th ir-
teen Lies by Deniers of the Nanjing Massacre (Nankin Daigyakusatsu hiteiron 
jūsan no uso)— written by a group of prominent history professors who spe-
cialized in research on Japan’s war time atrocities in China, such as Fujiwara 
Akira, Kasahara Tokushi, and Yoshida Yutaka—as a “counterpoint to the 
Nanjing Massacre denial in Japan revived by many factual errors in Iris 
Chang’s book.” But Chang never retracted her claim that at least three hun-
dred thousand Chinese had been massacred inside the city walls of Nanjing 
as part of Japan’s genocidal program.
Conservative NGOs in Japan, most notably JSHTR, seized upon  these 
problematic claims made by the Korean Council, Chang, and other advo-
cates of South Korean and Chinese victims. Th ey invoked their own, equally 
problematic version of objective truth to justify the Asia- Pacifi c War as a he-
roic act of self- defense. In fact, they even challenged professional historians 
who defended the historical facticity of the comfort- women system and the 
Nanjing Massacre. In par tic u lar, one of the JSHTR’s members, Fujioka No-
bukatsu, declared that “the age of experts is over” and argued, “Ordinary 
 people have misunderstood that only historians, experts of history, can un-
derstand how to interpret the history. But history is an academic discipline 
examining facts that are the closest to ordinary  people’s common sense and, 
therefore, ordinary  people are allowed to evaluate historical research in light 
of their common sense. . . .  Even amateurs can refute historians’ distorted 
arguments if they use their sound reason.” 64
Th us, with regard to comfort  women and the Nanjing Massacre, non- 
historians brushed aside questions raised by professional historians. Yun 
Jeong Ok was not a professional historian but a professor of En glish. Nei-
ther was Iris Chang a professional historian but a journalist. Two of the 
founding members of JSHTR, Fujioka Nobukatsu and Nishio Kanji,  were 
not professional historians,  either. Th ey  were both university professors, but 
they specialized in curriculum studies and German lit er a ture, respectively. 
Another JSHTR member, Higashinakano Shūdō, was also a university 
professor, but his specialty was Japa nese intellectual history. Above all, 
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Kobayashi Yoshinori, at one point the most popu lar JSHTR member 
 because of his Sensōron comic book series, was a cartoonist who had ma-
jored in French lit er a ture in college. Nevertheless, the problematic factual 
claims made by Yun, Chang, and the JSHTR members overwhelmed the 
cautious and refl ective voices of Japa nese historians who had dedicated 
their  careers to studying Japan’s past wrongdoings.
 After all, the ambiguous distinction between professional and amateur 
historians is only part of a larger, more fundamental prob lem of the rela-
tionship between historiography and commemoration as two overlapping 
modes of representing the past— this is the fourth institutional  factor that 
limits the infl uence of historians.65 For a long time historians and scholars 
of collective memory have debated on the relationship between “history” and 
“memory.” At fi rst, many historians and sociologists drew a sharp distinc-
tion between the two by defi ning history as “rational” and “objective” vis- à- 
vis memory as “irrational” and “subjective.” More and more historians, how-
ever, began to realize a variety of epistemological (and po liti cal) limits of 
their scholarship, given controversies over historical repre sen ta tions of the 
Holocaust, postmodernist challenges to “objective historical facts,” growing 
awareness of the existence of “subaltern history,” and ac cep tance of oral his-
tory and other new methods.66 As a result, most historians and scholars of 
collective memory now accept historiography and commemoration as sim-
ply two diff er ent modes of narrating the past, where one has no epistemo-
logical superiority over the other.
In this res pect, historiography and commemoration form what Paul 
Ricoeur called a truly “open dialectic,”  because their opposition can never 
be transcended into a synthesis of higher truth about the past.67 Put another 
way, they form a dialogical, symbiotic relationship, where they mutually con-
stitute and transform each other. As historian Aleida Assmann explained, 
“Historical scholarship depends on memory not only for oral testimony and 
experience, but also for criteria of meaning and relevance; on the other hand, 
memory depends on historical scholarship for verifi cation, substantiation, 
and falsifi cation.” 68 It is therefore diffi  cult for professional historians to 
invoke their cognitive authority to bring closure to the history prob lem 
 because politicians and citizens have their own memories whose criteria of 
epistemological validity are diff er ent from  those of the historians. Worse, 
historians are likely to be overwhelmed by memories of traumatic events, 
such as war time atrocities, as in East Asia’s history prob lem, for commemo-
rations of traumatic events tend to be so emotionally charged that  people 
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can often over- identify with victims and become unable to notice incon-
sistencies, omissions, and contradictions in available evidence.69
Th e diffi  culty that historians face is further compounded by the hetero-
geneity of historiography vis- à- vis commemoration. As the term “historians’ 
debate” suggests, controversy, not consensus, is the norm for historians. When 
diff er ent historians maintain competing interpretations of the same historical 
event,  these interpretations can be used by competing groups of po liti cal 
actors to legitimate their preferred commemorative positions. In such a sit-
uation, historians are unable to arbitrate competing commemorations. On 
the contrary, they are likely to exacerbate the competition by lending credi-
bility to each of the commemorative positions.
East Asia’s History Education Prob lem
Furthermore, the limited eff ect of historians’ debate on governmental and 
public commemorations is aggravated by two characteristics of history edu-
cation in East Asia that prevent younger generations from developing the 
competencies to critically refl ect on the history prob lem. Th e fi rst is the heavy 
focus on memorization. Since entrance exams for secondary and higher ed-
ucation are extremely competitive and based mostly on multiple- choice 
questions, Japa nese, South Korean, and Chinese students are required to ab-
sorb large amounts of knowledge from elementary through high school. As 
a result, history education at primary and secondary levels forces students 
to memorize dates of impor tant historical events and names of prominent 
historical fi gures in preparation for exams. Such memorization- based his-
tory education tends to create the impression that history is a fi eld with 
clear, distinct answers, appropriate for multiple- choice questions, mislead-
ing students to accept a certain version of the past as an objective truth. 
Students are thus deprived of opportunities to develop the cognitive skills 
necessary to weigh confl icting historical evidence and adjudicate between 
competing interpretations— the very cognitive skills required to deal with 
the history prob lem.70
Especially in Japan,  these shortcomings in history education are mag-
nifi ed by the limited coverage of modern and con temporary history in 
primary and secondary education. Japa nese history textbooks devote con-
siderable space to ancient history prior to the 1868 Meiji Restoration but pro-
vide only brief coverage of the twentieth  century when Japan committed 
aggression and atrocities against South  Korea and China. Lessons on the 
twentieth  century are also typically off ered at the end of the school year, 
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when both teachers and students are busy preparing for graduation ceremo-
nies and entrance exams, ensuring students get only quick and superfi cial 
exposure to the historical period. In fact, the Japa nese government deliber-
ately limited the teaching of modern Japa nese history in schools precisely 
 because the historical period was central to the history prob lem. In August 
2005, for example, Machimura Nobutaka, then minister of foreign aff airs 
and former minister of education, admitted that the Ministry of Education 
advised schools to minimize the teaching of modern Japa nese history so as to 
prevent some “Marxist- Leninist teachers”— JTU members in particular— 
from inculcating in students self- hatred  toward Japan.71
Machimura’s position, however, not only refl ected the LDP’s longstand-
ing aversion to the JTU, but also pointed out an impor tant prob lem with 
the pedagogical tendency among history teachers in Japan. For JTU teach-
ers, “Never send our  children to the battlefi eld again!” was their most impor-
tant slogan, consistent with the Tokyo Trial historical view that allowed no 
justifi cation for Japan’s past aggression.72 Accordingly, JTU teachers strongly 
criticized the conservative government for promoting the nationalist com-
memoration that presented Japan’s past aggression as a heroic act of self- 
defense. At the same time, JTU teachers, and Japa nese teachers in general, 
 were trained in the existing Japa nese education system, where history edu-
cation was anchored in memorization. As a result, they did not always 
provide their own students with the kind of history education that would 
encourage critical evaluation of historical evidence and interpretations. 
Although education reforms during the Occupation changed the emphasis 
in history education from emperor- centered nationalism to pacifi sm, the basic 
structure of history education in Japan— the emphasis on memorization— 
did not change.
Postwar history education in Japan was therefore torn between two 
diametrically opposing forces: the conservative government promoted na-
tionalist commemoration of the Asia- Pacifi c War, whereas JTU teachers 
promoted the Tokyo Trial historical view that judged Japan as solely and 
entirely guilty of the war. To preempt controversies over how to teach 
modern Japa nese history, the Ministry of Education deci ded to reduce the 
coverage of the twentieth  century in history textbooks and emphasize the 
chronological, empiricist approaches in history curriculum.73 Since history 
education in Japan continues to downplay the modern period and empha-
size memorization, the majority of Japa nese citizens are ill- prepared to en-
gage in constructive debates on the Asia- Pacifi c War among themselves or 
with South Korean and Chinese citizens.
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Th e situation of history education is not much diff er ent in South  Korea 
and China,  either. Since South Korean students have to amass large amounts 
of knowledge to compete for admissions to universities, history education 
in the country is focused on memorization.74 Similarly, while school curri-
cula in China are heterogeneous across provinces and rapidly changing in 
recent de cades, Chinese history lessons also heavi ly focus on memorization 
of historical events, as well as emphasize their moral- ideological implica-
tions.75 Th e education systems in Japan, South  Korea, and China thus share 
the tendency to pres ent students with versions of the past as objective truths, 
rather than as provisionally settled interpretations open to  future revision. 
As educational researcher Edward Vickers cautioned, “Th e prospects for 
implementing a pedagogy that truly encourages a critical approach to the 
past are likely to remain poor” in East Asia.76 If younger generations in 
the three countries continue to be taught memorization- based history les-
sons, the history prob lem  will retain the risk of escalating into an intracta-
ble confl ict over incommensurable versions of the past.
Ultimately, however, the fundamental prob lem with history education 
in East Asia is not the focus on memorization per se, but the ability of the 
governments to control the content of history lessons via textbook inspec-
tion. In Japan, South  Korea, and China, teachers can use only history text-
books that are approved by their ministries of education.  Under  these 
textbook- inspection systems, textbook writers and publishers have the 
formal freedom to decide on the structures and contents of their history 
textbooks. Given the legally binding curricular guidelines, however, 
many textbook writers and publishers are forced to exercise self- censorship.77 
 After all, the governments have the power to require revisions according 
to the curricular guidelines and thereby exert signifi cant control— almost 
censorship— over history textbooks.78 As a result, history textbooks deci-
sively infl uence citizens’ historical views, as Ienaga Saburō recognized: “No 
bestseller can beat a textbook. You can stop reading other books if you do 
not like them. But you have to read a textbook,  whether you like it or not, in 
order to gradu ate from school. For this reason, I think that a textbook is a 
more eff ective means than a public- security law for the government to in-
fl uence the minds of citizens.”79
Specifi cally, the Japa nese government has insisted that history textbooks 
include only “facts,” not interpretations or disputes.80 Take, for example, 
the government’s counterargument against Ienaga’s lawsuit. At the Tokyo 
High Court in 1980, the government accused Ienaga of “making no distinc-
tion between history and history education. . . .  At the level of compulsory 
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education, history education does not reach the level of specialized scholar-
ship. Its aim is to provide students with basic historical knowledge that 
Japa nese citizens should possess. . . .  History textbooks should be written 
based on doctrines widely accepted in academia . . .  and textbook writers 
should take into consideration developmental stages of students.”81 Th e gov-
ernment thus argued that historians’ debate should not be imported into 
history education  because the latter’s ultimate goal is to educate members 
of the Japa nese nation, not to train historians.
Th e government’s counterargument, however, suff ered from two seri-
ous prob lems. First, as Tōyama Shigeki, a history professor who supported 
Ienaga, pointed out, “Foundational historical questions, which require 
comprehension of complexly intertwined historical facts, necessarily lead 
historians to exercise their own historical judgments. With res pect to  these 
questions, disagreement among diff er ent doctrines is especially strong.”82 
Put another way, if history textbooks are to include only descriptions of the 
past where historiographical debates are already settled, they cannot but 
become short  because they are unable to provide details of impor tant his-
torical events, many of which are still contested— indeed, Japa nese his-
tory textbooks are very thin. By demanding that students be taught only 
already established historical facts, the government kept Japa nese citizens 
from developing the competencies to interpret the diffi  cult past critically 
and in de pen dently.
Th e second and more serious prob lem is that the Japa nese government 
assumed that students are not mature enough to work through confl icting 
interpretations. Again, Tōyama argued in defense of Ienaga:
We should not make  children and adolescents fear disagreement. We 
would like students to know that they can examine and refi ne their own 
ideas by having dialogues with other  people who have diff er ent ideas. If 
 there are only citizens who uncritically obey the government’s decisions, 
democracy  will be destroyed. Th e Ministry of Education argues that stu-
dents in elementary, ju nior high, and high schools have no competence 
to make their own judgments. But this argument is based on the wrong 
understanding. If we carefully prepare teaching materials, students  will 
show the astonishing ability to form their own judgments.83
Tōyama thus criticized the artifi cial separation between history and history 
education as the government’s attempt to deploy history education to pro-
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duce obedient citizens. Nagahara Keiji, another history professor and 
supporter of Ienaga, even more forcefully criticized the separation as remi-
niscent of the prewar system that had promoted “patriotic- spiritualistic his-
tory education by decoupling history education from history.”84
Even though Ienaga’s lawsuits helped increase descriptions of Japan’s 
past wrongdoings in history textbooks, they ultimately failed to eliminate 
the system of textbook inspection itself. Moreover, by resorting to law-
suits, Ienaga and his supporters created the paradoxical situation wherein 
historians are forced to give up their professional authority to adjudicate 
competing historical judgments among themselves, and instead allow judges, 
who are not experts of history, to write offi  cial history in the form of judicial 
judgments. Ienaga was indeed aware of this paradoxical situation and the 
negative implications that his lawsuits created. Th is is why,  after the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in August 1997, Ienaga stated, “I hope that the textbook- 
lawsuit movement  will develop to eventually abolish the system of textbook 
inspection itself. I  really hope that the next generation  will do it.”85  Here, 
Ienaga’s long strug gle and lasting hope is also relevant to historians and edu-
cators in South  Korea and China, where the writing of textbooks is even 
more heavi ly regulated by the governments.
Given their power to defi ne and impose legitimate versions of the past, 
then, the governments in East Asia remain the most impor tant actors driv-
ing the dynamic and trajectory of the history prob lem, despite the growing 
role of mass media in recent de cades.86 So long as the governments in Japan, 
South  Korea, and China control history textbooks via their curricular 
guidelines and inspection systems, offi  cially approved history textbooks con-
tinue to teach nation- centered histories: history textbooks in Japan provide 
descriptions of Japan’s past wrongdoings only in minimal amounts, whereas 
history textbooks in South  Korea and China promote patriotism based on 
legacies of anti- Japanese re sis tance. In the meantime, since none of the teach-
ing materials produced by nongovernmental joint proj ects have been able 
to pass governmental inspection, they are used in schools only as informal 
supplemental materials, thus failing to fully import historians’ critical re-
fl ections into history education. In short, as Kosuge Nobuko observed, “One 
of the most urgent tasks in the pro cess of resolving the history prob lem and 
moving  toward reconciliation is ‘to historicize history (rekishi no rekishika).’ 
Th e prob lem in East Asia is the politics that does not permit the historiciza-
tion of history and the plurality of historical interpretations, that is, the poli-
tics that supports and reproduces ste reo types about former enemies.”87
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From Historians’ Debate to Cosmopolitan Commemoration
In theory, historians have the potential to infl uence the dynamic and tra-
jectory of East Asia’s history prob lem for two reasons. One is their unique 
status in the fi eld of the history prob lem. Even though historians can en-
gage in advocacy activities and act like any other po liti cal actors in the fi eld, 
they mostly act as “disinterested  others” who provide historical materials for 
other po liti cal actors to articulate their commemorative positions. Another 
reason is the demographic shift in the region. Since  those who  were born 
 after the Asia- Pacifi c War are now the majority in Japan, South  Korea, and 
China, their commemorations cannot but draw on evidence and interpre-
tations put forward by historians. At this historical juncture, an increasing 
number of historians engage in joint research and education proj ects, form-
ing a transnational epistemic community as an infrastructure of cosmopoli-
tanism: they incorporate foreign perspectives into historical narratives and 
focus on transnational interaction as a unit of analy sis. Th is growing histo-
rians’ debate at the transnational level pres ents the potential to problema-
tize nationalist commemorations in Japan, South  Korea, and China and 
move other po liti cal actors in the fi eld  toward more cosmopolitan positions.
In practice, however, the cosmopolitan potential of the historians’ de-
bate is constrained in vari ous ways. First of all, no institutionalized channels 
exist for joint proj ects by historians to eff ectively infl uence offi  cial commem-
orations in Japan, South  Korea, and China. Furthermore, the ability of his-
torians to eff ectively infl uence the governments and citizens is undermined 
by two other  factors. One is that scholarly output of historians is almost al-
ways mediated by mass media willing to sacrifi ce accuracy for sensational-
ism. Another is that the coexistence of historiography and commemoration 
as two overlapping and equally legitimate modes of narrating the past grants 
historians only weak authority over non- historians. Especially in East Asia’s 
history prob lem, which is concerned with extremely complex and emotion-
ally charged historical events, historians themselves are embroiled in contro-
versies over evidence and interpretations, and their historiographies can be 
easily brushed aside by nationalist commemorations. Th e potential for histo-
rians as rooted cosmopolitans is further curtailed by the disconnect between 
their debate and history education, engineered by national governments 
 eager to deploy history lessons as moral education for their citizens.
Th us, the cosmopolitan potential of the historians’ debate to help citi-
zens critically refl ect on their nationalist commemorations has not been fully 
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realized in East Asia. As a result, Japan, South  Korea, and China remain 
trapped in the history prob lem. George Santayana’s aphorism, “Th e one who 
does not remember history is bound to live through it again,” is justly 
famous, but remembering the Asia- Pacifi c War according to the logic of 
nationalism  will likely contribute to repeating a similar tragedy in the 
 future. To ensure that citizens in the three countries  will not “live through 
it again,” is  there any way to eff ectively deploy historians’ critical refl ections 
to shift commemorative positions of relevant po liti cal actors in a more cos-
mopolitan direction? Th e next chapter examines this question.
